Curriculating from the Black Archive – Marginality as Novelty

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Abstract
The Black Archive is constitutive of works of literato such as JT Jabavu, Nontsizi Mgqwetho, the artist Gerard Bhengu, and musicians like Busi Mhlongo. This collective resource, which should play a crucial role in curricularising, compels us to consider two questions when rethinking Philosophy curricula: First, pedagogically, how does the epistemic access that the Black Archive affords our context facilitate justice? Second, and importantly, how does it help us in achieving justice? I, here, answer these questions in three moves. First, I consider certain key propositions; namely that decolonisation facilitates epistemic access, and that epistemic access in turn facilitates justice (historical, epistemic, and social). Second, I demonstrate how these propositions require the Black Archive (in South Africa) in order to be held as valid. I demonstrate this claim in Philosophy using Dumile Feni’s African Guernica, and in Curriculum Studies, through analysing W. W. Gqoba’s Ingxoxo Enkulule Ngemfundo. I conclude by prescriptively outlining uses for/of the Black Archive, guarding against misappropriations that derail justice as I treat it, safeguarding this corpus from epistemic arrogance that maintains that knowledge is valid only insofar as it is developed by white scholars.

Keywords: Black Archive, Dumile Feni, Epistemic Access, Natural Justice, Pedagogy, W.W. Gqoba

Introduction
I come to the writing of this text having worked in curriculum transformation and decolonisation in the education landscape of South Africa. This paper, therefore, is inspired by the calls to see justice realised; a call rooted in one of the works I will analyse in my argument. A conception of justice derived from the Black Archive seeks to abrogate the continued exclusion of knowledge developed by Black/Indigenous people. Exclusion, here, refers to the silencing, marginalisation,

* I am thankful to North-West University for their gracious invitation to address their Humanities Lekgotla in November of 2019, where I presented the first draft of this paper.

1 In this respect, my project is constitutive of profiling and positioning the contribution of Blackness/Indigeneity to the knowledge project. My conception of justice, as rooted in the arts, facilitates an understanding that allows us to articulate justice from the global South. I hold that this contribution augments a comprehensive understanding of justice from the margins.
and erasure of the knowledge of scholars who detailed the repercussions of coloniality on Black/Indigenous subjectivities, as they were manifested in the 19th and early 20th centuries. The school of thought of these scholars, who were writing as early as the eighteenth and nineteenth century, is epitomised by William Wellington Gqoba, whose work will be used to detail the role of education in the country. The occlusion of the Black Archive has resulted in epistemic arrogance that maintains that the only knowledge worthy of inclusion in our context has been developed by white scholars; a matter I demonstrate in note three below. The reproduction of this form of epistemic arrogance is ongoing, as is evidenced by the silencing, neglect, and marginalization of Black scholars of ubuntu, such as Mabogo More and M. B. Ramose, with students and professors privileging the work of white scholars like Leonhard Praeg, who are neither competent in the languages of ubuntu, nor familiar with the cosmologies of its progenitor groups, i.e. Zulu, Xhosa, Tswana, or Basotho people. This is to say that in the questionable conceptual move that divorces praxis from theory (see Praeg, 2014), white scholars continue in their historical tradition that claims that Africans are without knowledge – or better still – that African knowledge is only of worthwhile consideration when whiteness rescues it from Blackness/Indigeneity.

This abstraction has culminated in the decontextualisation and mis-reading of African thought by white scholars. To elucidate, there are two moves at work here. In the first sense Black/Indigenous scholars who possess the lexical tools that facilitate the ontic, epistemic and cosmological understanding of ubuntu are ignored. In ignoring them Black/Indigenous thought

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2 I make reference to these two centuries on the basis of the scholars I discuss. My choices should not, however, be read as exhaustive of the responses that were proffered by Blackness/Indigeneity as coloniality unfolded.

3 This is witnessed in Praeg’s (2014: 60-61) formulation, i.e. ‘[f]or it seems to me that in order for ubuntu praxis to be reapropriated as Ubuntu, a certain circumcision [my emphasis] is called for, one through which the ontic [sic] orientation of ubuntu, the fact that “having ubuntu” is a function of ritualised becoming-through-other people, will need to be deontologised or reinvented in order to retain its relevance in a postfunctionalist context, where our humanity or personhood as rights-bearing individuals is accepted as an existential and ontological bottom line, not subject to the vagaries of communitarian consensus or ritualised processes of belonging.’ This formulation, in its dismissal of Black/Indigenous ontology, is premised on the racist economies of knowledge production that continue to proliferate in and define the University and Philosophy as discipline in the country. By racist logic I draw the readers’ attention to the notion of the ‘reapropriation and circumcision [that is] called for’. Framing Black/Indigenous thought as in need of ‘circumcision’ reveals Praeg’s (2014) phallic thinking, that is not only possessive but has wrought violence and has been the premise of Eurocentric imposition in our context. More importantly, these white scholars (Praeg and company) are regarded and regard themselves as experts on Black/Indigenous knowledge, all the while masquerading as progressives and denying their racist attitudes.

4 To demonstrate this point with more veracity, I point the reader to the Zulu aphorism ‘izinyane lemvubu kalidliwanaga ingwenya kwacweba iziziba’, (Nyembezi and Nxumalo, 1966: 62) which captures a form of curative violence in the ethics of ubuntu. The treatment of African thought by white scholars has been such that we have bought into notions of ubuntu that deride this underlying ethic that portends an ubuntu rooted in African conceptions of justice. This is to say that ubuntu as developed by white scholars has divorced the intrinsic humanness that the progenitor groups ascribe to its value and social uses – ubuntu is now fashionable only insofar as it is a theoretical concept that is at best vacuous and at worst misrepresents the realities that gave birth to it.
is stolen, repackaged as the white mans’ discovery⁵ – which is itself a continuation of colonial tropes that frame knowledge only as valid when developed by whiteness. In the second sense, by ignoring these Black/Indigenous scholars, Black thought as a category is ignored. Ignoring Black thought confounds the first move of decolonial propositions, i.e. working towards epistemic access, which in turn facilitates justice. These two moves that buttress erasure, on the premise of racist knowledge production logics, deny us a comprehensive understanding of ubuntu that is rooted in language; understanding(s) that are required for theorising ubuntu and the realities that ubuntu as praxis and as philosophy addresses. These realities are rooted in Black life and African subjectivities, while informing the philosophy of ubuntu whose meaning (as philosophy) is derived from the inter-subjectivities of Blackness/Indigeneity. I, therefore, take issue with this reasoning and its epistemic arrogance that divorces thought from the realities of those at the centre of said thought; Black subjectivity.⁶ Post 1994, the South African people were led to believe that higher education would be constructed as a social institution that would work towards the amelioration of historical injustices instituted by centuries of domination and subjugation. This framework is derived from an analysis of the White Paper 3 of 1997. I anticipate objections to my framing, objections that are rooted in the thinking that Philosophy as discipline is a second order discipline and should not be forced to deal with socio-political reality.⁷ This objection is premised on academic freedom and institutional autonomy; objections which are dealt with in a previous publication (Kumalo, 2020). As I have dealt with this debate elsewhere, I invite the reader to consider the abovementioned treatise, as I do not pay attention to these objections here.

This occlusion of Black thought is a form of modes of abjecting in the contemporary Historically White University (HWU) (Kumalo, 2018).⁸ Abjection, here creates the Native of Nowhere, which denotes a graduate who can neither fully identify with their own cosmology, which is relegated to the margins on the premise that it is fictitious or mythological and lacks

⁵ Praeg (2014) uses this very concept of ‘discovering’ Black thought, a term for which I critique him as it is racist and reminiscent of the colonial thinking about and uses of disciplines such as Anthropology in the project of conquering Blackness/Indigeneity. It was the ‘discovery’, as if Blackness/Indigeneity was an inanimate object to be discovered by arrogant, racist bigots with their glutinous modes of thinking, of Africa that led to the violence witnessed all across the continent and this violence still manifests itself as the racist logics of knowledge production seen in Praeg’s (2014) treatise – wherein a man who cannot even speak the language – can claim to produce a Report on a system of thought, he distorts and violates beyond something recognisable by its progenitor groups.

⁶ This substantiates the claim that contemporarily, justice in the country is superficial and continues to pander to the interests of whiteness at the expense of Blackness/Indigeneity.

⁷ This objection is given to anyone who demands that Philosophy departments in the country do work (research or teaching) that is socially responsive and that addresses the realities of South Africans in a meaningful way.

⁸ My use of abjection follows the thinking of Jones (2016: 322) when she writes ‘[with] abjection at the helm [of discarding Blackness/Indigeneity] and science backed by the epistemic virtue of defeasibility, we should not be surprised if science seeks repeatedly to sanction ideas about abject black people.’
scientific empiricism, nor fits neatly into the university that is premised on the culture, mores and values of whiteness. Scientific empiricism, then, becomes the framework by which we judge knowledge that is included in the Ivory Tower, the University. Scientific empiricism can inaugurate a lengthy debate (as it has done, historically) about canon formation and its political and historical imbrications. There are two critiques, however, that I wish to advance against scientific empiricism, even if briefly. The first foregrounds epistemic mis-framing, which addresses the problem/demand that African systems of thought be compliant with western conceptions of knowledge, with a failure to do so being the qualifying premise for our excluding African knowledge from the University. This is indicative of the imperative to address the question of justice. This awkward and problematic demand derived from scientific empiricism is aptly dealt with, albeit in a fleeting fashion, in the authors’ note to Noni Jabavu’s *The Ochre Peoples: Scenes from a South African Life* (1963). Jabavu writes:

May I have a word surreptitiously with Xhosa-speaking readers – ‘bite their ear’, as we say? The present Orthography of the language came into general use after I had learnt its predecessor and I have never become reconciled to it. I dislike the appearance of symbols like ‘th’ for aspirated ‘t’; marks for tone pitch; double vowels in plural noun-prefixes, verb tenses, demonstratives, ideophones, and so on. This is the reason why, where I have written out a Xhosa sentence, my spelling is erratic. I am among those who, ‘eating with the old-fashioned spoon’, believe that for languages so ‘dominantly vocalic in character’ [...] nothing short of a new script should be devised. The roman is not suitable, and will always make for troublesome – and ugly – reading or writing (Author’s Note in *The Ochre People: Scenes from a South African Life*, 1963).

These orthographic changes contested by Jabavu (1963) point to an Anglicisation, not only of isiXhosa but broadly of our knowledge(s), in a bid to have the language fit into the lexicographic, orthographic and semantic rules of English. It is useful to reiterate the underlying question of my analysis, i.e. how do we arrive at justice. Extraversion, either through language or thought, runs the risk of losing the textures and nuances that inform Indigenous African subjectivity. I would go so far as to suggest that the demand that African thought fit neatly into established categories, shores-up Eurocentric epistemic arrogance that maintains that our

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9 For a more considered debate on this matter, consider Kumalo’s (2018) work wherein he writes about *Explicating Abjection – Historically White Universities Creating Natives of Nowhere?* As this debate has been detailed by Kumalo, it is used here to set-up the framework for my analysis.

10 It is this very logic and mind-set that has Praeg (2014) desirous to discover African thought such that he can conform it to western epistemic paradigms – a process of conformation that is witnessed in his dodgy move that separates praxis from philosophy!

11 This question introduces my analysis of the Black Archive, specifically in relation to Philosophy as discipline and Dumile Feni’s *African Guernica* (1967). Anglicising African thought denotes the epistemic imposition of euro-western epistemology.

12 I detail this above, in the passage that elucidates the decontextualisation, through abstraction, of African thought by white scholars.
knowledge systems are gradual, backward and retarded as per Mudimbe’s (1988) observation of how African subjectivity has been mis-framed in and through the *Invention of Africa*. The second critique highlights obstructions of justice, reinforcing the impetus to inquire about the category - justice.

Justice as authentic justice, which denotes an adherence to principles of justice for their intrinsic value, aligns with Ramose’s proposition (2002: 463) when he writes, ‘what people hold to be natural or fundamental justice does not always coincide with justice according to law. Legal justice will remain a contested area as long as it does not coincide with the ordinary perceptions of natural or fundamental justice.’ What Ramose (2002) highlights, in his critique of Humean thought\(^\text{13}\), is what Hume classifies as artificial justice, an adherence to justice for its extrinsic value, legalistic frameworks of justice. Miller (1981: 60), analysing Hume’s intellectual corpus, distinguishes natural from artificial justice, contending that ‘[justice], which briefly, consists in a respect for others’ property rights is considered artificial’. Artificial justice is concerned only with the invented social conventions, but is intrinsically divorced from our moral judgements. Simply put, artificial justice is problematic insofar as it sidesteps moral and ethical questions concerning justice.\(^\text{14}\) Distinguishing artificial from natural justice facilitates an interrogation of the efforts of decolonisation. Decolonisation of the curriculum is concerned with justice and is aligned with the contemporary zeitgeist, that institutions change and recognise the *ontological legitimacy* of Blackness/Indigeneity. This is to say that students want to see their realities reflected in the curriculum. The desire that students expressed – to see their realities reflected in the curriculum – inspired curriculum reviews across universities; reviews that were aimed at authentic justice and that sought to challenge what Lange (2014) understands as the vacuousness of transformation.

In an effort to shift the geography of reason from a legalistic/formalistic conception of justice and align it with a fundamental one, I discern here – how we come to formulations of justice. I do so by posing a second-order question: do we concern ourselves with justice in its artificial or fundamental form in curriculum? This compels me to critique the two propositions that exist in the literature, namely the integrative and additive approaches. In what follows, my argument highlights how both these approaches adhere to artificial justice. Put differently, I am concerned with fundamental justice as it relates to teaching, learning and curriculation. This showcases the use of marginal works in thinking through contemporary challenges while remaining cognisant of history.


\(^{14}\) The reader might find Alasdair MacIntyre’s analysis *Whose Justice? Which Rationality?* useful. MacIntyre’s work can be used to analyse contemporary debates around ‘standards’, with the inclusion of African thought in our teaching praxes framed as the lowering of standards by those resistant to change; a claim that seeks to secure the place of white settler colonial descendant futures, while continuing to displace and obscure the knowledge of Blackness/Indigeneity in the academe. In light of this delegitimation of Blackness/Indigeneity in the academe it might be useful to consider Mohanty’s exposition of *The Epistemic Status of Cultural Identity* (1993).
What is in an Integrative Approach?

Transformation, as empty signifier, is addressed by Lange (2014) in her analysis of the languages of and for transformation. This analysis is indicative of the problem with an integrative approach in curriculum planning and design. Lange (2014) notes that transformation, as used in higher education, lost its political and moral impetus – as it advanced strategies that failed to substantively engage the historical realities of the country. This is seen in the claim (Lange, 2014: 8), ‘I contend that in order to get out of the four unfortunate consequences of the adoption of a performative view of transformation, ... we need to undertake a historical-sociological analysis of these three types of knowledge that will provide contextual depth and historical perspective to develop a richer notion of transformation.’ Lange (2014: 9) highlights the lack of political will to correct the moral problematics birthed by history and the contemporary socio-political order. With transformation as an empty signifier that is concerned with ‘performative transformation’ (Lange, 2014: 8), it deviates from the intended functions of higher education as proposed by the White Paper 3 of 1997.

The integrative approach suffers from the vacuousness that characterises transformation in the country as noted by Lange (2014). Thompson, et al., (2012), and Antony (2012) think through curriculum revisions in Philosophy. They advocate the integration of curricula that reflects the realities of previously excluded groups inaugurating the debate of the political as power. The political as power signifies what Kumalo (2018) terms a contestation of ontologies in the sense of Mignolo’s (2009) and Gordon’s (2014) argument concerning the matter of whose knowledge counts. In detailing this contestation Gordon (2014: 84) writes:

> Along with the expansion of Christian kingdoms into nation-states and their colonies, which resulted over the course of a few hundred years into European civilisation on a global scale, was also a series of epistemological developments that have literally produced new forms of life: new kinds of people came into being, while others disappeared, and whole groups of them occupy the age in an ambivalent and melancholic relationship by which they are indigenous to a world that, paradoxically, they do not belong to.

> Gordon’s (2014) assertions substantiate the Native of Nowhere, who is made to doubt, through our teaching praxes and the knowledge that is prized as legitimate in the University, their belonging to this institution that estranges them from their native subjectivity. Essentially the HWU as suggested by Kumalo (2018), in his claim of a Native of Nowhere, perpetuates the phenomenon of an ambivalent colonial melancholy that produces people who are ‘indigenous to a world that, paradoxically, they do not belong to.’ This formulation is reminiscent of Mamdani’s (2005) notion of African categories of thought that are still ensnared in Eurocentric frameworks that arrest our capacity to imagine ourselves out of European modernity. Put differently, the Native of Nowhere, created through our teaching praxes, is a contemporary

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15 In *Explicating Abjection* Kumalo (2018: 3-4) uses ‘contestation of visibilities’. Refracting the concept to read as ‘contestation of ontologies’ better explains his argument.
student who can neither identify with the institutional culture of the HWU nor their own epistemic and ontological underpinnings as a result of ‘knowledge that is imported from London, Hull, and Manchester’ (Lebakeng, et al., 2006). Furthermore, and equally concerning is the mis-framing of African thought, when it is developed and taught, a concern that is substantiated by the analysis presented in the introduction, wherein I treat the angst I have regarding the ‘leading thinkers’ of ubuntu being white scholars who cannot read, speak or write any of the progenitor languages of ubuntu.

Simply, in an integrative framework, where one knowledge system is brought in to co-exist with another that has enjoyed hegemonic preponderance, how are knowledge practitioners to negotiate the power dynamics at play? This question highlights the requisite demand to deal with these power dynamics and how they define the knowledge project; this is to say that the knowledge project is inherently characterised by coloniality. Highlighting the power dynamics that define knowledge, surfaces the shortfalls of an integrative approach in dealing with the politics of knowledge production; and importantly – centres the question of justice. When thinking about knowledge and its political status, the question, ‘how can we curate a system wherein knowledge(s) co-exists coevally’, resurfaces with more verve. This comes as knowledge production has been and continues to be defined by the political as power.

Curating a coeval existence in the knowledge project, is taken-up by Kumalo and Praeg (2019) who address knowledge practitioners concerned with the decolonial agenda. They maintain that MacIntyre’s (1988) notion of translation may be framed as a solution. In detailing this problem, Kumalo and Praeg (2019: 2) argue, ‘[in] light of the reality that different colonial systems had varying impacts on the peoples of the global South, it is worth considering the divergences that exist between traditions.’ This consideration contextualises the socio-political, when attempting to correct the problem of domination, whether politically or in the knowledge project; a move rooted at the heart of the decolonial tradition. This is to say that when thinking about responses to epistemic injustices, we cannot assume that one solution will be useful in all contexts. To frame the debate in this way highlights the ‘divergences ... between traditions’ (Kumalo and Praeg, 2019: 2) as a result of coloniality having impacted different locales differently. However, what of the pitfalls of this approach?

The integrative approach is challenging in light of the power dynamics surfaced above. This observation is rooted in a preceding claim that asserts that knowledge exists in a political context, defined by political actors. The political (as episodic event) and politics serve the strongest political actor; revealing what is meant by the concept of the political as power. Put differently, one needs to consider whether South Africa expected a group of people, whose political preponderance seemed threatened by the democratic dispensation, to serve societal

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16 These power dynamics are what define the raging debates around African Philosophy (and the scholars who are regarded as authorities of African Philosophy) in departments of Philosophy in the country. These debates and contestation are defined by the raciality that constitutes the South African academe – which would have us relegate Black/Indigenous knowers to the periphery, while centring scholars such as Praeg (2014).
transformation authentically, in the sense of fundamental justice. An investigation of this nature, however, does little to answer the question, ‘how do we curate a socio-political condition, wherein two divergent epistemic traditions can co-exist coevally?’ My response will come to light through my analysis of the Black Archive. This exposition, however, showcases some of the shortcomings with an integrative approach. An integrative approach, therefore, while laudable, does little to correct the problem of epistemic injustice and institutes further challenges.

**Critiquing the Additive Approach**

The integrative approach requires a mediation of the power dynamics derived from coloniality.\(^{17}\) In turn the simplest objection to the additive approach is its superficiality. Zoe Todd (2016) substantiates this position in *An Indigenous Feminist’s Take On The Ontological Turn*, while critiquing systems of decolonisation that perpetuate colonial epistemic injustices.\(^{18}\) She contends, ‘[i]t is easier for [euro-western] people to tangle with a symbolic polar bear on a Greenpeace website or in a tweet than it is to acknowledge arctic Indigenous peoples and their knowledge systems and legal-political realities’ (Todd, 2016: 6). Todd surfaces the problems encountered when Indigenous modes of knowing are added into mainstream debates. This is to say that these debates shore-up the notion that European thought continues to lead world thought. Outlaw (2018: 246) supports this critique when he argues, ‘central to these ventures [of European colonial expansion and dispossession] was the denial of the humanity of African peoples ... denials that required elaborate rationalisations from those most “able” of European thinkers, among them the long-since canonised philosophers Kant, Hegel, [and] Hume.’ Outlaw (2018) details how European thought frames itself as *sui generis* the source of philosophy. An additive approach therefore, presents us with the challenge of Indigenous knowledge being subsumed under colonial logics. The obstacle(s) of this approach arise from knowledge(s) that originate(s) in other parts of the world being subsumed by and subsequently presented as the invention of European thought. This logic is contested by Todd (2016: 7) when she further argues, ‘I was left wondering, when will I hear someone reference Indigenous thinkers in a direct, contemporary and meaningful way in European lecture halls?’ This question can be posed in South Africa, specifically as it relates to literato who have considered epistemic injustice all the while their work has been marginalised with social epistemologists privileging Miranda Fricker’s (2007) theory. To demonstrate this point, uMqhayi’s introduction to *Ityala Lamawele* (1914) is useful:

\(^{17}\) To substantiate, I draw my readers’ attention to Mamdani’s *When Victims Become Killers*, wherein in ‘Thinking About Genocide’, his analysis reveals that the power dynamics of knowledge that I address here, have far reaching implications in the project of (post)-colonial state formation and identity in Africa. Mamdani (2001: 14) asserts that ‘[before] undertaking this analysis, however, I propose to discuss both how native and settler originated as political identities in the context of modern colonialism, and how the failure to transcend these identities is at the heart of the crisis of citizenship in postcolonial Africa.’ This crisis is taken up, time and again by the contributors of the Black Archive as they think through the place and role of Black/Indigenous subjectivity in light of the impositions of coloniality.

\(^{18}\) These forms of decolonisation are presented, in the South African context, as transformed curricula that continues to displace and abject – in the sense of killing off – Blackness/Indigeneity through denying, erasing and ignoring the contribution of Black/Indigenous intellectuals.
Kweli balana ndizama ukubonisa imigudu ... nexesha elithatyathwayo ngamaXhosa xa [elandela] umthetho, kuba kaloku kuzanyelwa ukuba uzelwe kwisibakala esakhe saakho. Ndizama nokubonisa ukuba inkosi asinguyena mgqibi wase Ingqoka wezinto yedwa, nje ngoko izizwe ziba zona kunjalo kuthi. Intetho nemikhwa yesiXhosa iyatshona ngokutshona ngenxa yelizwi nokhanyo olukhoyo, oluze nezizwe zase Ntshona-langa (1914: v).19

Todd’s (2016) question and uMqhayi’s assertions highlight the limitations with the integrative approach, which has been critiqued for its continuation of the power imbalances in knowledge; it continues to be aligned with artificial justice. This brief analysis highlights how the additive approach, is itself imbricated in the first; the integrative approach. Both are indicative of the setbacks instituted by seemingly progressive thinking. The propositions that exist in the literature therefore, do little to correct this issue of unequal power dynamics and epistemic injustice. An alternative could be found in Fricker’s (2007) theory which proposes virtue epistemology in counteracting epistemic harms. However, this approach is itself contested as it fails to address the challenge in South Africa.

My contestation stems from the reality that Fricker’s (2007) model deals with epistemic injustices as they play-out between individuals – the speaker and the hearer and not in a systemic way, i.e. as epistemic injustices relate to groups and institutional oppression. To substantiate Fricker (2007: 1) states, ’[by] contrast, the project of this book is to home [sic] in on two forms of epistemic injustice that are distinctively epistemic in kind, theorising them as consisting, most fundamentally, in a wrong done to someone specifically in their capacity as a knower.’20

In sum, an additive approach can be critiqued for its lack of substantive engagement with the epistemic predispositions of Black/Indigenous knowledge as highlighted by Kumalo and Praeg (2019: 1) when they maintain, ‘[these] performances of “decoloniality”, which often take the form of elaborately ritualised and expensive decolonial lectures delivered by international scholars, amount to a form of “box-ticking” that lacks substantive engagement with locally situated struggles, debates and dialogues’. An additive approach therefore, perpetuates and entrenches artificial conceptions of justice. In response to these approaches, I propose the Black Archive, which substantively engages the lived realities of Blackness/Indigeneity outside of whiteness for as Fanon states it:

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19 In this short tale, I explore the customs and systematicity of the Xhosa people as they think through legal arbitration and how it relates to social life. This comes as they attempt to locate legal arbitration in their historical traditions and customs. I also showcase that the King is not the sole adjudicator when it comes to jurisprudential matters, as the nation exists in relational ties to one another. My aim in showcasing these facets of Xhosa jurisprudence is in highlighting how our epistemic practices are being erased owing to the impositions of the colonialists. (Authors translation)

20 More importantly, Fricker’s project deals with contexts where minorities are oppressed by the majority, with her analysis making use of examples in the United States. While this might be useful in drawing parallels, ours is different in the sense that we here had/have a majority oppressed by a minority that elides and occludes the experiential knowledge of those who have been and continue to be oppressed.
The colonised subject thus discovers that his life, his breathing, his heartbeats are the same as the colonialist’s. ... If in fact, my life is worth as much as the colonist’s, his look can no longer strike fear into me or nail me to the spot and his voice can no longer petrify me. I am no longer uneasy in his presence. In reality to hell with him. Not only does his presence no longer bother me, but I am already preparing to waylay him in such a way that soon he will have no other solution but to flee ([1963] 2004: 10).

Turning to the Black Archive signals a recognition of the legitimacy of Black/Indigenous thought and a rejection of European colonial categories that would have us think of our knowledge as useful only insofar as it is reported, written and documented by white scholars. To the white man lording over Blackness/Indigeneity I say to hell with him, to hell with his appropriations and mis-readings of African thought. To hell with his epistemic arrogance and contemporary coloniality and to hell with his infectious disease that turns Blackness/Indigeneity into a threat against itself. In this, the threat that becomes the Black Indigene owing to the disease that is the white mans’ mode of thinking that has been internalised by said Indigene, I join scholars like Nomusa Makhubu and Khanyisile Mbongwa (2019: 13) when they contend that ‘Makhanya (2018) reprimands what he calls a “category of woke black people who suffer from this debilitating disease of obsession with whites” who cannot “define themselves independently of white people” and are “so engrossed with the idea of whiteness that they are actually an impediment to decolonisation.”

**An Alternative – the Black Archive**

I, therefore, think through bypassing the pitfalls of an additive and an integrationist approach. In this respect my argument addresses the key propositions of decoloniality, namely that decolonisation facilitates epistemic access and that epistemic access in turn facilitates justice (historical, epistemic and social). To do this, I propose the Black Archive. In my treatment of the Black Archive, I processually deal with these key decolonial propositions demonstrating their usefulness in reconceptualising (Philosophy) curricula. The Black Archive is constitutive, in part, of Black intellectuals and scholars i.e. Plaatje, Soga, and Mqhayi who were instrumental in championing a struggle against the epistemic erasures of colonialism since the nineteenth century. The Black Archive, both historically and contextually locates the demand advanced by students that we revise and decolonise curricula while addressing the ethical culpability of dominant European thinking. In this demand, I interpret the actions of students to be vying for the realisation of fundamental justice. An ethical culpability that is rooted in the epistemic erasures and arrogances of whiteness, which has been termed ‘epistemicide’ (De Sousa Santos, 2016; Grosfoguel, 2007 and 2013; Lebakeng, et al., 2006; Mignolo, 2009; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2018; Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Zondi, 2016) by scholars working in African philosophy and the decolonial tradition, undermines the status of Africans or people of African descent as knowers. This culpability creates the Native of Nowhere (Kumalo, 2018). I wish to stress that the Black Archive, however, does not portend a nationalist project, rather it acknowledges the historicity of

How, then, does the Black Archive ameliorate the condition of epistemic injustice? There are two things that can be said by way of answering this question. The first lies in how we define the Black Archive. This collection of work is not only constitutive of thinkers, intellectuals, artists and knowledge practitioners that are Black in the sense of Indigeneity. The Black Archive is constitutive of practitioners that fought against coloniality in the Southern African region since the decolonial moment, the moment of contact. The second highlights the responsiveness of this knowledge to the local conditions, while also remaining globally relevant. Global relevance is derived from the use of the Black Archive as a teaching tool that is in conversation with other thinking. This is to suggest a decolonial teaching praxis that is aligned with the argument advanced by Dussel (2013) when he calls for inter-epistemic dialogue. Inter-epistemic dialogue, in the Dussellian sense, differs from an additive or integrationist approach in that it substantively engages alternative epistemic frameworks while locating them in dialogue with dominant traditions. The Black Archive therefore, shifts the geography of reason, and facilitates alternative modes of knowledge production. Having defined the Black Archive, I now move on to consider its application.

**Fundamental justice in Feni’s African Guernica**

Feni (1967) concerns himself with the effects of euro-western thought on Blackness/Indigeneity, while highlighting colonial imposition as it concerns white fears and was meant to belay them. These white fears are aptly addressed and detailed by J. M. Coetzee in his *Waiting for the Barbarians* (1980), a text that is poignant when thinking through the historicity of white fear(s) in our context, even as Coetzee does not disclose the location of his fictional tale. What Feni (1967) captures in a chilling artwork (Figure 1), whose magnificence is not only remarkable but also poignant, even in the contemporary day is addressed by literato such as Alan Paton ([1948] 1957) in *Cry, the Beloved Country*. Paton (1957: 72) deals with these concerns in the following manner:

[bathi] lapho izisebenzi zingakhokhela khona imali enhle, nesizwe siba mpofu. Ukukhokhela kahle izisebenzi kuthuthukisa yonke into, kuthuthukise nemisebenzi. Abanye bathi kuyingozi lokho ngoba noma izisebenzi eziholelwa kahle zizoba namandla

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21 The Black Archive, as I am developing and arguing for it here, is not the canon. It might be useful in forming a new canon, however, it is not the canon. The Black Archive denotes the creative, intellectual and artistic work of Black/Indigenous people who were concerned with thinking through the Fact of Blackness despite coloniality. The use of “non-traditional” knowledge production mechanisms (i.e. music and art) was necessitated by the exclusion of Black/Indigenous people from the traditional knowledge production site; the University.
Confronting this observation, as it was inaugurated by segregationist laws, Feni’s work is useful for three reasons. In the first instance, Feni (1967) addresses the question of the deracination of Black/Indigenous life. His project in this artistic work refocuses the principle question that is guiding my analysis; how do we arrive at justice? The reader should recall the predefining propositions that lead to the question of justice, this being the proposition of epistemic access as a medium that facilitates justice. The question of justice re-centres Paton’s (1957: 73) vexing oeuvre that delivers the punch-line of his novel through his lamentation:

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For the English translation of this work see Paton (1948: 68).
I frame Paton’s observation in book one of the novel as vexing owing to an oscillation between Coetzee’s (1988) poignant remark of a white South African identity that still clings to euro-western notions while corrupting and despoiling the African landscape, a point that Feni (1967) addresses through his work.

My argument is in line with Young’s (1990: 5) contention that:

[normative] reflections [as is the case here] must begin from historically specific circumstances because there is nothing but what is, the given, the situated interest in justice, from which to start. Reflecting from within a particular social context, good normative theorising cannot avoid social and political description and explanation.

Young’s (1990) contention that ‘good normative theorising cannot avoid social and political description and explanation’ highlights how Feni conceptualises and subsequently theorises social life under apartheid; a conception and theorisation that is reflected in the eviscerating African Guernica. More so, Young (1990) highlights the centrality of Feni’s work in curriculation strategies concerned with fundamental justice. Feni’s (1967) work reminds the philosopher of the
split between Hannah Arendt and Levi Strauss as detailed by Villa (1998), concerning the role of the philosopher in the polity.24

While Plato, in the *Republic*, critiques poetry for its inadequacies in addressing philosophical questions25 – a critique that might be extended to the artistic medium – Feni’s artwork might be read as a precursor to Jane Alexanders’ *Butcher Boys* (1986), and Willie Bester’s *Election 94* (1994). These artworks capture the sentiment of a young nation grappling with the extrications between constitutional/democratic freedoms and the lived realities of the nation, thus poignantly addressing the reality of justice.26 This is to say that Feni’s *African Guernica* (1967) is of immense import in aiding our understanding of Young’s (1990: 5) contention that ‘[social] description and explanation must be critical, that is, aim to evaluate the given in normative terms. Without such a critical stance, many questions about what occurs in society and why, who benefits and who is harmed, will not be asked, and social theory is liable to reaffirm and reify the

24 As Feni (1967) is addressing the question of Black/Indigenous personhood and subjectivity as it relates to a political system that defined Black people as less than and non-human, the philosophical emerges in how this dehumanisation – which signifies an inherent injustice – is to be dealt with by the philosopher. Plato in Book I of the *Republic* addresses this point through Thrasymachus’ relenting the task of defining justice and rather stating, (Lindsay, 1935: xxxii) ‘[the] ruler rules because he is unjust, and injustice is virtue and wisdom, strength and happiness.’ This observation, which is challenged by Socrates as the lack of fundamental justice, can be understood as defining the South Africa that Paton portrays in his novel, while the implications of this portrayal and conception of the Indigene are visually represented by Feni’s *African Guernica*. In Book IV, as Socrates has defined justice through the ideal state, it is noted (Lindsay, 1935: xiii) ‘[now] that justice is discovered, it can easily be seen that it is the health of the soul, and injustice the disease, and it might readily be inferred that justice is better than injustice; but Socrates proposes that they should first of all examine injustice in four types of unjust cities.’ Lindsay notes of Plato’s ruminations on the ideal state and the role of the philosopher in the polity (1935: xiii) ‘[these] later books [Xenophon’s *Memorabilia*] still maintain the possibility of the ideal state, but they discourage the philosopher from taking part in practical politics. He is sadly advised to “hold his peace and do his work, like a man in a storm sheltering behind a wall from the driving storm of dust and hail.”’ This claim marks the distinction between Arendt and Strauss in that the philosopher citizen is discouraged, rather the philosopher is directed to assume the role of one who is concerned only with abstract thought. The rejection of this position is detailed by Arendt (1994: 428) thusly, ‘[the] event which started our tradition of political thought was the trial and death of Socrates, the condemnation of the philosopher by the *polis*. The philosophical then, presents itself as the ethics of statehood, as statehood (in the case of South Africa) relates to the deliberate and intentional negation of Blackness; concepts which are aptly captured and expressed in and by Feni’s *African Guernica* (1967). More importantly, as noted by Socrates in Book IV of the *Republic*, injustice is seen as the disease of the soul. This disease is dealt with as the animalistic traits given to the figures depicted by Feni’s paintings.

25 This critique is presented as follows (Lindsay, 1935: 296), ‘between ourselves – and don’t denounce me to the tragic poets and all the other imitators – all such things seem to pollute the understanding of those who hear them, unless they possess a knowledge of their real nature; that is an antidote.’

26 These experiences of the Indigene are articulated in and through language. By holding to the proposition of divorcing praxis from philosophy as proposed by Praeg (2014), we see here the continued denial of the Indigene as a subject that is able to think and express these thoughts – without the guidance of whiteness. In divorcing language from the philosophy, Praeg (2014) plays into racist logics that treat the Indigene as an invalid, in constant need of the aid of whiteness; a logic inherited from the racism of whiteness and one that is lauded as scholarship, which itself demonstrates the racism inherent in higher education – as institution – in the country.
given social reality.’ This reality is precisely what we see in Praeg’s (2014) analysis; an argument that is uncritical of reality, maintaining rather the status quo that continues to abject the Indigene. How then, does Feni (1967) address Young’s (1990) stated task of social theory. Concerning himself with the amorality of a totalitarian regime (apartheid), Feni (1967) depicts Blackness/Indigeneity under a political system that tears asunder the fibre of Black life. Depicted as an animality that defines the diseased soul characteristic of an injustice against Blackness/Indigeneity -that has furthermore been internalised- owing to centuries of dehumanisation, the artist addresses three things; first a political system that is amoral resulting in structural oppression. Second, the ontological denial of Blackness/Indigeneity that frames Blackness as sub-human, finally and thirdly the implications of this reality. Derived from an analysis of structural oppression – seemingly, a pre-emptive move to the third component (implications) that his work highlights – Feni deals with dehumanisation through the visceral depiction of figures that simultaneously seem human and animalistic. Animality in Feni’s work is negotiated through the baby suckling on the udder of a cow, with a further two beings/beasts – one as three legged and another atop a cow – foregrounded in the painting.

Feni’s (1967) depiction questions the treatment and representation of Black life and subjectivity as dealt with by Alan Paton in Cry, The Beloved Country. Feni plays with the concepts of past and present forms of Black life through the images that are foregrounded and those that appear in the background. Preceding the animalistic images, and depicted with a slight fading tonality that is reminiscent of an image that is falling out of view, are depictions of humans; a style that might point to Feni’s lamentation of the disease that is infecting Blackness/Indigeneity as a result of the injustice it is subjected to. In addressing dehumanisation, Young (1990: 11) is once again useful in discerning the role and function of justice as dealt with by Feni (1967) when she writes:

The principle of equal treatment originally arose as a formal guarantee of fair and inclusive treatment. This mechanical interpretation of fairness, however, also suppresses difference. The politics of difference sometimes implies overriding a principle of equal treatment with the principle that group differences should be acknowledged in public policy and in policies and procedures of economic institutions, in order to reduce actual or potential oppression.

Young’s claims in the abovementioned excerpt point to the complexity that Feni’s work invites when thinking about justice in the country. Simply put, Feni invites us to systematically consider how to heal the diseased soul – as it were – in a post-conflictual context such as ours. Addressing justice through a close reading of African Guernica (1967) requires then, that we interrogate public policy arrangements as they attempt to confer ontological legitimacy on Blackness/Indigeneity in a country where this was denied owing to an amoral political order. Analysing public policy and institutional arrangements acts as a rejoinder to our conceptions of justice and how we arrive at them contemporarily. This is to say that through a philosophical reading, Feni (1967) compels us to the task of discerning conceptions of justice owing to the
historical injustices that continue to define Black life in South Africa. These historical realities are seen as a Black life riddled with crime, unemployment and depravity derived from poverty; a depravity reminiscent of Paton’s observation in *Cry, the Beloved Country*. In dealing with this, I once again turn to Young (1990: 15),

I suggest that justice means the elimination of institutionalised domination and oppression. Any aspect of social organisation and practice relevant to domination and oppression is in principle subject to evaluation by ideals of justice. Contemporary philosophical theories of justice, however, do not conceive justice so broadly. Instead, philosophical theories of justice restrict the meaning of social justice to the morally proper distribution of benefits and burdens among society’s members.

Reading Feni (1967) in conversation with Young (1990) compels us to inquire about contemporary responses that have been proffered by philosophers, to the question of social injustice and domination derived from coloniality. What we are presented with is artificial and not fundamental justice. Supplementing philosophical theory with artistic works compels the University, as institution, to return to the White Paper 3 of 1997 and how it conceptualised this institution. This prompts us to interrogate Curriculum Studies and practices, insofar as they uphold the ideals of justice through the University as institution. This brings me to my second consideration.

*Ingxoxo Enkulu Ngemfundo – In pursuance of discernment*

The conqueror writes history,
They came, they conquered and they wrote.
Now you don’t expect people who came to invade us,
To write the truth about us.
They will always write negative things about us,
And they have to do that because,
They have to justify their invasion
(Miriam Makeba, 1969)

Education, in South Africa, is defined -historically- by debates that contest its role, function and place; a debate that that has attempted to discern the aims of education. As indicated in the introduction, my concern is with justice. My conception of justice, as it relates to higher education, is informed by the White Paper 3 of 1997, which defined education as a social institution that would ameliorate injustices instituted by centuries of domination and subjugation. To this end,
William Wellington Gqoba’s seminal work *Ingxogo Enkulu Ngemfundo* ([1888]/1906) becomes the central focus of my analysis. The poem curates a debate between 32 participants, each of whom brings a perspective of not only education but also of the implications of coloniality on native life. Gqoba’s ([1888]/1906) aim is to highlight both the negative and positive aspects of education and its impact on Black subjectivity. Consider the following composition, (Gqoba, [1888] 1906: 49)

Aba bantu baPhesheya,  
Ngabaze kusibulala,  
Basihluthe nomuhlaba,  
Asinawo namakhaya

Soligoso stakes this claim as a character described as having reaped the fruits of education, and yet continues to be suspicious of its uses in the wake of all that Blackness/Indigeneity has had to surrender to whiteness. Soligoso’s suspicions of education are framed by Gqoba ([1888] 1906: 46) in the following manner:


This is demonstrated by another participant, whose words substantiate the claim made in the introduction about the silencing, marginalisation and negation of Black thought. His contribution aims to highlight the duplicity of white colonial settlers, whose fraudulence in the

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27 The title of this poem translates to ‘The Great Debate about Education’. In the paper, however, I protest translating this poem as a translation undermines the veracity of what is intended. In this sense, I join Noni Jabavu in the claim that the roman script for a language so vocalic as isiXhosa makes for ugly and troublesome reading and writing. It is intended that my analysis will aid readers who are not native speakers of isiXhosa in understanding the excerpts from the poem. Furthermore, I must stress Coetzee’s (1988) position, while radicalising it: the vast majority of white scholars claim native identity and yet know not a single African language. My protest against translation seeks to drive the point home, that as natives in the land of our forebears we will no longer acquiesce to being treated as second class citizens when our languages are constitutionally recognised.

28 Native speakers of isiXhosa will understand that the name, in and of itself, is indicative of the contribution that this character will make to the debate in line with historical conceptions of naming and indigeneity’s treatment of naming. The same can be said of all the participants in this debate – a matter that corroborates the notion of an ‘Adamic language’ as suggested by Coetzee (1988: 8-9) when he writes, ‘[but] dissatisfaction with English would in turn hold for any other language, since the language being sought after is a natural or Adamic language, one in which Africa will naturally express itself, that is to say, a language in which there is no split between signifier and signified, and things are their names.’ It is necessary to indicate that in the case of isiXhosa as it is used in this paper, things are indeed their names.
guise of education was paraded as a form of leading Blackness/Indigeneity to enlightenment, while in fact it was intended to dispossess Blackness/Indigeneity even of its own resources and knowledge. Yiwenani has the following to say of dispossession; one that continues to manifest as the obfuscation of Black scholars on intellectual subjects whose progenitor languages the leaders (i.e. Praeg, 2014) of this category of thought know nothing about, (Gqoba, [1888] 1906: 63–64)

Ehla gxebe mntakabawo,
Uqwelile kule ngxoxo;
Uthe khona wakufika,
Kweli qhetsu lamagwangqa
Elithe labonakala
Kokwenziwa kweli bala
Lolu hlanga lwabaMnyama,
Wandifeza, wandigqiba.
Uthe khona wakungena
Kweli sheyi nolu lunya
Lwemfundiso eyinkongo,
Ndaziva ndinesingqala!
Intiiziyo ibuhlungu,
Yinkohliso yamagwangqa,
Amabandla aphesheya.
Kuyinkohla, kuyinkinga,
Sesifane samafiko,
Ukuxoxa sikohliwe;
Ukuthetha siphelele.

Prior to summating my argument by showcasing the link between this great debate and curriculum studies, I wish to pay brief mind to Yiwenani’s contentions. In lamenting colonial settler arrival and its effects of dispospossing Black/Indigenous people, the abjection that Kumalo (2018) speaks of can be traced back to the claims propounded by Gqoba as early as the 19th century through Yiwenani. The reader is, here, confronted with colonial settler dispossession, duplicity and an amorality that Feni (1967) showcases as the corruption of Black/Indigenous subjectivity. It must also be remembered by the reader that this injustice in the Socratic sense is viewed as a disease of the soul, a disease that manifests as the death of the nation, expressed by Paton as the lamentation ‘Lafa Elihle Kakhulu’ ([1948]/1957). In this composition, I cannot stress sufficiently the challenge that was the imposition of colonial education, with Bhedidlaba, another of the debates’ participants, observing the following of colonial imposition and infiltration, (Gqoba, [1888] 1906: 47):
On wanting to discern the views of the younger participants of the debate and how they negotiate the impact of colonial education, Bhedidlaba invites us to consider the link between this historic intellectual contribution and curriculum studies. Concerning itself, principally with three questions, curriculum studies asks, ‘what is to be taught, how is it to be taught, and for what purposes is it to be taught’?

These questions evidently showcase the purposes of the Black Archive in the contemporary pursuits of justice and a decolonised curriculum in the South African University. As Kumalo (2018) has successfully argued that the continued reliance on a pedagogic slant that is premised on western epistemic paradigms creates the Native of Nowhere, a matter that was raised as early as the times of W. W. Gqoba, it is imperative for us to consider what is taught, by whom is this subject matter taught and why it is taught in our contemporary lecture theatres. These questions help us to discern the violence that is disguised as scholarship; scholarship that invariably mis-educates and maintains epistemic violence (see Praeg, 2014).

Conclusion
A great deal more can and remains to be said on the uses and the usefulness of the Black Archive if indeed higher education is to function with the intended aims of delivering on the promise of justice; as was intended by the White Paper 3 of 1997. However, cautionary remarks are in order on the uses of the Black Archive. These are a result of the continued marginalisation of Blackness/Indigeneity by those who divorce the abstract knowledge that they create using the intellectual corpus of the progenitor groups, while further acting as the institutional gate-keepers that disallow a correcting of the script through continuing to rubbish and silence Black thought. As the reader might have gleaned from my use of language, it plays a crucial role in understanding the insights, experiences and ontic positions from which the oppressed Black person speaks. Language then, in the Black Archive, is a necessary distinguisher that disqualifies this epistemic resource from being used as a careerist ticket for those who would steal from Blackness/Indigeneity without any recourse for these fundamental injustices (see Praeg, 2014). Simply put, working with and in the Black Archive means that scholars are not only familiar with the progenitor languages that gave rise to this knowledge, but furthermore are concerned with fundamental justice. This is to say that as Black scholars working with the Black Archive we will not allow for this area of scholarship to once again be high-jacked by intellectually trite thinkers who masquerade as progressives while stealing from Blackness/Indigeneity in suggesting that knowledge is knowledge only insofar as it is produced by white scholars in our context.
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